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1. Introduction
 the Republic Plato contrasts dialectic with mathematics on the
grounds that the former but not the latter gives justifications of
some kind for its hypotheses, pursuing this process until it reaches
‘an unhypothetical principle’. But which principles are unhypo-
thetical, and why, is rather dark. One reason for this is the scarcity
of forms of that precious word, ‘unhypothetical’ (νυπθετος), used
only twice by Plato (Rep. 510 b 7, 511 b 6) and just once by Aris-
totle (Metaph. 1005B14). But that very scarcity also suggests the
intriguing possibility that Aristotle has Plato’s text in mind when
he uses the word, so we might expect to understand Plato better by
grasping how Aristotle took him. That is a notoriously defeasible
assumption since plenty of modern accounts of Plato want to save
him from Aristotle’s numerous critiques, and hence imply that the
master of them that know frequentlymissed the point when it came
to his own master. But surely we can be more confident that Aris-
totle will give us access to Plato when it appears not merely that he
is dealing with the same topic, but using the same rare vocabulary
to boot.
Hence the understandable temptation to turn to Metaphysics Γ
for help in identifying Platonic unhypothetical principles. I shall
argue that Aristotle is indeed thinking of Plato’s text when he uses
the word for ‘unhypothetical’, and further that what is explicitly
an unhypothetical principle for Aristotle might well have been one
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for Plato too. But later I shall claim that their joint use of a much
more common word in the same philosophical context is either
coincidence or misunderstanding on Aristotle’s part, for he must
mean something di·erent by it from what Plato means.
2. Plato and Aristotle share a similar
conception of the unhypothetical
Let us begin with Aristotle’s example of an unhypothetical prin-
ciple. In chapter 3 ofMetaphysics Γ he is considering propositions
that are true of all things whatsoever qua things-that-are: he refers
to any such proposition at 1005B14 as unhypothetical. So the ques-
tion is whether Aristotle is thinking of the same kind of principle
as Plato at the end of Republic 6 and, by implication, Phaedo 101 e
1, where the hypothetical method is supposed to conclude in the
discovery of ‘something su¶cient’. Initially, it seems that he is.
For Aristotle tells us two things about these ‘firmest principles of
everything’ that are surely true of the end-points of enquiry Plato
has in mind:
(1) Unhypothetical principles are such that error about them
is impossible [βεβαιοττη δ ρχ πασν περ ν διαψευσθναι
δνατον] (1005B11–12). (I shall call this the incorrigibility
condition.)
(2) Unhypothetical principles are necessarily the most intel-
ligible principles [γνωριµωττην τε γρ ναγκα!ον ε"ναι τν
τοιατην] (1005B13). (I shall call this the intelligibility condi-
tion.)
Now the incorrigibility condition is surely true of the end-points
of Plato’s hypothetical method too. That method proceeds roughly
as follows (I am here drawing on both Republic 6 and the end
of the Phaedo, necessarily compressing quite a bit). Make a safe
hypothesis and then check to see whether its results cohere with
one another (λλ$λοις συµφωνε!, Phaedo 101 d 5).1 If they do not,
the hypothesis is false and you had better start again. If they are
coherent, put your original hypothesis among the set of results of
another ‘higher’ proposition (presumably a more general one) and
1 For an account of what this coherence consists in, see D. Bailey, ‘Logic and
Music in Plato’s Phaedo’, Phronesis, 50.2 (2005), 95–115.
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see if it coheres in the right way with all of them, and so on. This
is supposed to be a method we can continue so long as we might be
wrong in supposingour current highest propositiontrue.Therefore
the method comes to a stop only when we reach a proposition that
we know we cannot be wrong in supposing true.2Only when we see
that the highest proposition we have reached has this property will
we know that there is no need to try justifying it further by putting
it among the set of results for a still higher proposition. For we will
realize that there is no such higher proposition, so no such further
justification is possible.
From this we can tell that the intelligibility condition is true of
Plato’s unhypothetical first principle as well. For how is it that we
will know when we have reached the highest proposition? What
property will it have that allows us to recognize that there is no
proposition still higher with which we can give a justification or
explanation for it? Surely it will be the fact that it is utterly imme-
diate to us. From our point of view nothing could explain it better
than it explains itself. So there is neither need nor possibility of
looking for an explanation for it. It is therefore as intelligible as any
proposition can be.
But, Aristotle tells us, there is a third feature of (at least some)
such principles, which is also characteristic of their unhypothetical
nature:
(3) Unhypothetical principles are necessarily part of the equip-
ment of anyone who grasps any of the things that are [ν
γρ ναγκα!ον &χειν τ'ν (τιο)ν ξυνι+ντα τν ,ντων, το)το ο.χ
/πθεσις] (1005B15–16). (I shall call this the priority condi-
tion.3)
Logically this condition seems di·erent from the others. The in-
corrigibility and intelligibility conditions appeared to be both ne-
cessary and su¶cient for being unhypothetical. But, for Aristotle
at least, the wording of the priority condition makes out that satis-
fying it is su¶cient for being unhypothetical without even carrying
the implicature that such satisfaction is also necessary for being un-
2 I grant that there might be other interpretations of what it is for a proposition
to count as ‘something su¶cient’. But this seems to me to be the most plausible
reading.
3 For the purposes of this paper I am avoiding the di¶cult issue of whether the
relevant concept of priority here is temporal or logical.
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hypothetical.4 Is there any interesting correspondence in the case
of Platonic unhypothetical principles?
An answer to that question will turn on what kind of mental state
Aristotle has in mind in his use of the verb for ‘grasp’. Given the
context, this state will obviously be some kind of knowing, but of a
possibly non-luminous kind.5Take the example of Heraclitus. For
Aristotle, Heraclitus will be someone who does indeed grasp some
of the things that are, just by virtue of being rational (at least in some
moods). In that case, he will know anything one needs to know of
necessity in order to knowanything at all. In that case, hewill know,
among other things, the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC).6
But this knowledge will be non-luminous, at least for Heraclitus:
for far from being in a position to know that he knows PNC, he
mistakenly believes he has succeeded in denying it. So PNC is
somethingHeraclitus knows without knowing that he does, or even
(at least according to him) believing that he does.
Are there examples of such complicatedmental attitudes towards
the unhypothetical in Plato?Arguably there are, in theMeno at least.
For one might take the result of the examination of the slave boy to
be that, in some sense, he knew the theorem all along, by virtue of
his soul’s experiences in the discarnate state, but was not (at least
at the start of the experiment) in a position to know that he knew
it, or able to express this knowledge.7Now of course what the slave
4 I am grateful to Terry Irwin for pointing this out to me.
5 I owe this observation to JimmyDoyle. Following TimothyWilliamson, a men-
tal condition C is (roughly) luminous if and only if whenever an individual is in C,
that individual is in a position to know that C obtains. See T.Williamson,Knowledge
and its Limits (Oxford, 2000), ch. 4.
6 Given what I have said about the priority condition being merely su¶cient
for being unhypothetical, it is of course an assumption that PNC satisfies it. But
given that PNC is not merely unhypothetical, but paradigmatically so, I think it is a
plausible assumption to make.
7 This interpretation requires a reading of theMeno di·erent from that proposed
by, among others, Gail Fine, in her ‘Inquiry in the Meno’, in G. Fine, Plato on
Knowledge and Forms (Oxford, 2003), 44–65. According to her arguments, Socrates
refutes his construal of Meno’s Paradox of Enquiry by using the Theory of Recol-
lection to show that one of its premisses—the claim that one cannot enquire into
that which one does not know—is false. According to the interpretation sketched
above, Socrates would be disarming the paradox by using the Theory of Recol-
lection to show that a di·erent premiss—the claim that one cannot enquire into
what one does know—is false. The thought would be that, since the slave clearly
can enquire into constructing a square double in area a given square, that must be
because he already in some sense knows the answer: his immortal soul saw the truth
in a discarnate state and, while the trauma of birth renders impossible his answering
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boy knows latently but comes to think about actively by the end of
the discussion is not itself something unhypothetical, for it is a truth
derivable from prior propositions. So can we think of examples in
Plato in which there is possibly non-luminous knowledge of unhy-
pothetical principles, where it is also the case that being known in
this way is su¶cient but not necessary for being unhypothetical? I
think we can, although I lack the space to defend the point in detail.
Admittedly, the analogy of the Sun, used to illustrate the nature of
the Form of the Good, rather suggests that when the Guardians
come to know unhypothetical principles, their knowledge at least
at that moment will be luminous. For surely one cannot look at
so intensely illuminated an object as the Sun without being in a
position to know that one is looking at the Sun. Even if not all per-
ceptions are luminous, surely that one is, so it would seem that the
knowledge this perception is used to illustrate should be luminous
too. But equally surely, the Guardians will retain this knowledge
even when they are no longer looking at the Sun or the real things
it illuminates. They will continue to have this knowledge while
descending back to the murky gloom of the Cave when their eyes
become ‘full of darkness’ (Rep. 516 e 4–5). Arguably while in such
a condition the Guardians, analogously to Meno’s slave, will know
what they learnt outside the Cave without being in a position to
know that they know it (which might amount to their continuing to
know the first principles of dialectic even when not doing dialectic,
or attending to some object which cannot be treated dialectically,
such as the sensible world). So arguably their knowledge of unhy-
Socrates correctly straight away, it does not follow that he is completely lacking in
genuine knowledge about the theorem he eventually brings to mind. It might be
thought that what Socrates says at 85 c 10–12 causes trouble for this interpretation,
but in fact it does not. For of course, from the claim that if the slave is asked the
same questions in many di·erent ways, then he will end up knowing the answers as
accurately as anyone, it just does not follow that he does not, at least in some sense,
already know those answers. And Socrates’ description of what the slave can accom-
plish if questioned further only a few lines later, at 85 d 4 (‘recovering the knowledge
from within him for himself’), surely suggests the interpretation on o·er here. But
it is not clear to me to what extent Fine and I are in disagreement. It strikes me
as a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the Recollection Theory to suppose that
Socrates is introducing the concept of forgotten knowledge in order to falsify, albeit
in di·erent ways, both premisses that drive the Paradox of Enquiry, and not just the
one Fine takes to be relevant. On the Fine line, forgotten knowledge is something
you can enquire into that you do not know, just in so far as you have forgotten it. On
my line, forgotten knowledge is something you can enquire into that you do know,
just in so far as it is knowledge. And these two interpretations are quite compatible.
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pothetical principles is possibly non-luminous. But can we find in
Plato the further thought that the priority condition is (1) su¶cient
but (2) not necessary for being unhypothetical? Well (1) is easily
accomplished. For if we suppose that one comes to know anything
in the true sense onlywhen it is recognized either as unhypothetical
or as being dialectically inferable from something unhypothetical,
then it will follow that anything you need to know in order to know
anything will be unhypothetical. (2) is a little trickier to defend, but
I think it can be done once we ask ourselves howmany propositions
are unhypothetical for Plato. It is not clear in the Republic (nor in
related passages in the Phaedo) whether Plato wants to assert (∀x)
(∃y) (If x is an enquiry, then y is its unhypothetical terminus) or
(∃y) (∀x) (If x is an enquiry, then y is its unhypothetical termi-
nus). If he means the latter, then very likely he will have a di·erent
conception of the unhypothetical from Aristotle. For if there is at
least one unhypothetical principle at which all enquiries terminate,
it will satisfy the priority condition: and if there is only one such
principle, then satisfying the priority conditionwill be not only suf-
ficient for being unhypothetical, but also necessary. But if he means
the former, and there are a plurality of unhypothetical principles
distributed over di·erent subjectmatters, then itmay be that, while
of course knowledge of them will be necessary for knowledge of the
subject matter in question, some need not be known by someone
in order for him to know anything at all. For example, one needs
to know unhypothetical truths of geometry in order to know geo-
metric theorems properly, but that does not mean one must know
unhypothetical truths of geometry in order to know anything. If
there are a plurality of unhypothetical principles, satisfying the pri-
ority condition will be for Plato, as it is for Aristotle, su¶cient but
not necessary for being unhypothetical.
3. An example?
So there are compelling arguments for thinking that Plato and
Aristotle share, at least roughly, the same conception of the unhy-
pothetical. But it might be that these considerations can go only so
far in allowing us to characterize Platonic unhypothetical principles
along Aristotelian lines. For Plato is quite explicit that something
like a principle Aristotle regards as paradigmatically unhypothe-
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tical is for him, at least in one context, a hypothesis. Aristotle’s
paradigmatically unhypothetical principle is this:
(A) (=PNC) For the same thing to hold good and not to hold
good simultaneously of the same thing and in the same re-
spect is impossible (given any further specifications that
might be added against the dialectical di¶culties) [τ' γρ
α.τ' 0µα /πρχειν τε κα µ /πρχειν δνατον τ1 α.τ1 κα
κατ τ' α.τ· κα 3σα 4λλα προσδιορισα5µεθ 4ν, &στω προσδι-
ωρισµ+να πρ'ς τς λογικς δυσχερε5ας]. (Metaph. 1005B19–22)
Thich is surely, at least at first glance, similar to a principle Plato
formulates in Republic 4:
(P) It is clear that the same thing will not do or su·er opposites
in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the
same time [δλον 3τι τα.τ'ν τναντ5α ποιε!ν 7 πσχειν κατ
τα.τν γε κα πρ'ς τα.τ'ν ο.κ 8θελ$σει 0µα]. (Rep. 436 b 8–9)
I said just now that (A) is something like (P), but of course there
are important di·erences. (A) uses negation to specify what it says
is impossible—that something should hold and also not hold of
something—while (P) speaks in terms of opposites. That is, the
former supposes that contradictories cannot hold of the same thing
while the latter supposes that contraries cannot. But even Aristotle
is not embarrassed to express his principle in terms of contraries,
as he does a few lines later at 1005B26–7. Meanwhile, the proper-
ties with which Plato’s Socrates illustrates the consequences of his
principle, rest and motion, are arguably themselves contradictories
rather than mere contraries.8
Perhaps more importantly, (A) is modally stronger than (P). (A)
says that such-and-suchbeing the case is impossible (δνατον),while
the strongest construal of (P) is that it says that such-and-suchwill
refuse to be the case (ο.κ 8θελ$σει). This might make, in the end,
a great deal of di·erence between the two philosophers, for Plato
accepts that some things that never were, never are, and never will
8 I owe this observation to Christopher Shields. Modern philosophers might feel
uncomfortable with the thought that rest andmotion are contradictories, for it seems
there are plenty of things, abstract objects especially, which just are not the right
kinds of thing to be at rest or in motion: for instance numbers or space–time points.
But Plato certainly has no qualms about ascribing rest to his favourite abstract
objects, the Forms.
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be are nevertheless possible.9 His language is scarcely stronger a
few lines later at 436 e 8–437 a 2 when Socrates restates (P), saying
that he will not be disconcerted by sophistic tricks on the matter or
persuaded any the more that something might su·er or do opposites
etc. But to say that there is nothing that could convince you that
¬p is significantly weaker than saying that ¬p is impossible. At any
rate, the former is a statement about oneself, while the latter is a
statement about the truth-conditions of p—namely that they must
obtain no matter what.
These di·erences can be explained away partially by the dif-
ference in argumentative contexts. Given Aristotle’s broad aim of
determining the subject matter of metaphysics in Gamma, he will
want the meatiest and strongest general principle he can formulate
to be basic. Plato, by contrast, only wants something strong enough
to deliver the conclusion that the soul has parts, a claim which may
be independently plausible anyhow.10 In his drive for generality,
Aristotle will be interested in any properties that determine a com-
plement class, not just properties with opposites, and he will want
his principle to be as modally ambitious as possible. Meanwhile
Plato will naturally speak of properties with opposites as things
which most obviously cannot belong to the same thing in the same
respect, and will be happy if that claim is just plausible enough for
Socrates not to entertain any doubts about it.
But reference to the argumentative contexts is only a partial ex-
planation, since it cannot account for the following di·erence. For
Socrates, (P) is something to be hypothesized, as he says at 437 a
6–7: /ποθ+µενοι 9ς τοτου ο:τως &χοντος. Now Aristotle would say
that since the incorrigibility, intelligibility, and priority conditions
are true of (A) (and hence, let us suppose for the moment, also of
(P)) then no one can really believe that either (A) or (P) is ever false.
As he puts it atMetaph. 1005B23–6, ‘it is impossible for anyone to
believe that the same thing is and is not, as some consider Heracli-
tus said—for it is not necessary that the things one says one should
9 TheTimaeus holds (41 a–b) that it is possible for the world to perish even though
in fact it never will perish (a position with which Aristotle took umbrage inDe caelo
1. 11–12). For a discussion of the debate, see N. Denyer, ‘Never Will and Cannot’,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 74 (2000), 163–78.
10 And when he redeploys that fact in an argument in bk. 10, his language is as
modally strong as Aristotle’s. At 604 b 3–4 he asks whether ‘when two opposite
impulses occur in a man at the same time about the same thing, we say that of
necessity there are two things in him’.
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also believe’. But if one cannot really believe in a counter-example
to (A) or (P)—as Aristotle says Heraclitus cannot, despite what he
might say—then surely one cannot really believe that there might
be any counter-examples to those principles. In other words, one
cannot believe that either of them could have the provisional status
of mere hypotheses, propositions which might be false although we
treat them as true for the time being. So by the lights ofMetaphysics
Γ 3, would Aristotle tell Socrates that he cannot really believe what
he says to Glaucon when he introduces (P) as a hypothesis?
I think not. We can see that Aristotle and Plato are actually
thinking in the same way once we consider the di·erence between
an unhypothetical truth and its formulation in a context. Socrates
says that he will treat (P) as a hypothesis so that he and his inter-
locutors are not compelled ‘to prolong matters by going through
all such sophistries, confirming for ourselves that they are not true
[πσας τς τοιατας µφισβητ$σεις 8πεξιντες κα βεβαιοµενοι 9ς ο.κ
ληθε!ς ο;σας µηκνειν]’ (437 a 4–6). (P) is treated as a hypothesis
not because it might turn out to be false later on, but rather be-
cause, when formulated like that, the principle invites a number of
questions and quibbles, mainly about what the precise respects are
in which nothing can be both F and the opposite of F (Aristotle re-
cognized this too). Andwhen an unhypothetical truth is formulated
as the sort of proposition that invites such questions and quibbles,
one is entitled to treat the formulation as a hypothesis.
For all that he does not say he will treat (A) as a hypothesis, there
is none the less the same acknowledgement that something is miss-
ing in his formulation from Aristotle. He specifies a few constraints
on the conditions of F holding and not holding of the same thing to
be impossible (that it be at the same time, and in the same respect),
but then leaves o· from identifying other relevant considerations
in favour of a brief stage direction that such qualifications be taken
as read. While Socrates in e·ect says, ‘we shall just suppose that
this principle is true and ignore the quibbles for the moment’,11
Aristotle appears to be saying, ‘we a¶rm a suitably qualified ver-
sion of this principle, the details of whose qualification we shall not
bother to spell out at the moment’. So both philosophers state their
11 Soph. 230 b is an indication that this is the right way of taking what Socrates
says in the Republic. For here we get a fuller statement, this time from the Eleatic
Stranger, of the kind of qualifications that need to be made in making clear and
explicit what the Principle of Non-Contradiction says is impossible.
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principles with pretty much the same acknowledgement that the
explicit formulation omits important points of detail. Thus while
it initially seems an important di·erence that Socrates calls what
he says a hypothesis while Aristotle calls his version unhypothet-
ical, they are both aware of the fact that their actual formulations
of the principle are sensitive to the context, and hence somehow
inadequate. And in the case of Socrates, that his formulation is suf-
ficiently opaque for him to treat what he says as a hypothesis is
perfectly compatible with the fact that what it is a formulation of is
unhypothetical.
This is as it should be. For surely we want to be able to begin
investigations generally by saying ‘Suppose p’ for any value of p
whatsoever, even ‘Suppose that two twos make four’ or ‘Suppose
that I am now inviting you to make a supposition’. If we could not
formulate unhypothetical truths in a manner suitable for treatment
as a hypothesis, then it would be impossible to carry out any kind
of serious investigation into their nature, which is presumably one
of the things that the completed science of dialectic will do. It will
want, for instance, to know what is the hallmark of propositions
that are known to be true once formulated in the right way, and
in order to discover this it may be necessary to hypothesize the
unhypothetical. To say that unhypothetical principles are immune
frombeing hypothesizedwouldbe tomisunderstand the force of the
negative prefix in ‘unhypothetical’ for both Plato and Aristotle. In
calling a principle unhypothetical, one is not going so far as to rule
out the possibility of expressing the principle as a hypothesis. One
merely says that such a principle, unlike others, can be formulated
in a way that is su¶cient for knowing it immediately once it is so
formulated.
An illustration of the sort of thing I have in mind might help.
Mathematicians usually treat basic arithmetical propositions as un-
hypothetical in the way Aristotle treats (A). But sometimes other
mathematicians such as Frege treat the same propositions as hypo-
thetical in so far as they suppose them to be true but try to formulate
them more transparently. In doing this, they do not cast the kind
of doubt on those principles that would mean they do not actually
qualify as unhypothetical. Fregenever doubted that 2+2 =4.But he
thought, very reasonably, that you put the truth more transparently
(if more technically) when you say that the set of all pairs, when
related to itself by the addition relation, is identical to the set of all
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quartets. Or again, think of the Cartesian case in which one cannot
be wrong in thinking that one exists whenever one is thinking. The
formulation cogito ergo sum, for all its indubitability, is certainly the
sort of thing for which one can demand some sort of explanation.
For example, is it known to be true non-inferentially by some kind
of immediate intuition? Or is it inferred via the major premiss ‘All
thinking things exist’? Such questions can still be raised about that
famous formulation of the Cogito, even though what it expresses is
arguably unhypothetical.
This much, then, by way of argument that Aristotle and Plato are
speaking of the same thought in these two passages, and hence that
PNC or something like it might well be unhypothetical for Plato
too, even though Socrates explicitly hypothesizes his version of it.
If they are more or less the same principle, and Aristotle describes
his formulation of it with his master’s word ‘unhypothetical’, I see
no reason to resist the inference that Plato would have regarded the
same principle as unhypothetical too.
4. Baltzly on the unhypothetical
Still, this is not much by way of illumination. We want other ex-
amples of Platonic unhypothetical principles before we will feel
comfortable that we know what they are like. Fortunately at least
one philosopher, Dirk Baltzly, has suggested an ingenious way of
characterizing what might be meant by ‘unhypothetical’ without
drawing directly onMetaphysics Γ, although a consideration of his
arguments will ultimately lead us back there.12 Instead he turns
to the dialectic in the second half of the Parmenides, arguing that,
for Plato, a proposition is unhypothetical if its contradictory could
not even be formulated if its truth-conditions actually obtained.13
So, according to the first deduction of the second part of the Par-
menides, the proposition ‘TheOne has some share of being’ is unhy-
pothetical (142 a ·.). Parmenides says, ‘If something is not, could
anything belong to this thing that is not, or be of it? Therefore no
name belongs to it, nor is there an account or any knowledge or
12 D. Baltzly, ‘“To an unhypothetical first principle” in Plato’s Republic’, History
of Philosophy Quarterly, 13 (1996), 149–65, and ‘Aristotle and Platonic Dialectic in
Metaphysics Gamma 4’, Apeiron, 32 (1999), 171–202.
13 Baltzly, ‘“To an unhypothetical first principle” in Plato’s Republic’, 153.
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perception or opinion of it.’ If it really were true that the One has
no being—that the One is not—then this could not be expressed
in any form, for there would not be anything for an expression
about the One to be about. Since this is so, the contradictory of
the claim ‘One does not have a share of being’ is, Baltzly thinks,
unhypothetical.
According to this interpretation Plato also holds that the claim
that some of the kinds blend (Soph. 251 d 5 ·.) is unhypotheti-
cal, because if the truth-conditions of its contradictory arose and,
among other things, Being were apart from everything (includ-
ing itself), then one would not be able to say so, since that would
involve predicating something (namely non-blending) of Being,
which would involve saying that Being blends with something
(namely non-blending). So if being really were apart from every-
thing, one could not truly express this14 (I shall have more to say
about the logic of this argument below).
I am not convinced by Baltzly’s characterization, for a number
of reasons. Firstly, it seems to me that the passages he speaks of
have the style of proofs, and I hold that one of the reasons for
calling the end-points of Plato’s method ‘unhypothetical’ is that
they are propositions which neither need nor admit of proof (even
if, as I was just now arguing, we might be able to provide some
lesser form of explanation for them by trying alternative formu-
lations). As Aristotle argues when he comes to discuss PNC in
Metaphysics Γ, it is impossible that everything should have a proof
(3λως µ<ν γρ =πντων δνατον πδειξιν ε"ναι, 1006A8), and in par-
ticular his favoured unhypothetical principle ought not to be sus-
ceptible to proof since it is an ultimate belief for anyone proving
anything (δι' πντες ο> ποδεικνντες ε?ς τατην νγουσιν 8σχτην
δξαν, 1005B32–3).
I think this must be so just as much for Plato too. For according
to the end of Republic 6, an unhypothetical first principle15 allows
you to move step by step through every hypothesis used in reach-
ing it, in a series of moves from which it is the completely adequate
starting-point. But if it behaves like this, then even if it is not like
14 And ifNicholasDenyer is right (as I think hemust be) in thinking of expressions
as themselves being kinds, one could not express anything at all, true or false. See
N. Denyer, Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy (London,
1991), ch. 9.
15 In speaking of ‘an unhypothetical principle’ rather than ‘the unhypothetical
first principle’, I refer the reader back to the remarks in the main text of p. 106.
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Aristotle’s first principles in other respects, it ought not to be the
kind of thing that can be proved—in which case it ought not to be
the kind of truth entailed by the sophisticated arguments Baltzly
discusses. For the principles he takes to be unhypothetical are en-
tailed, on this story, by Plato’s tacit premiss that whatever can be
true can be said to be true when it is true. Hence any purported
truth that would be falsified if it were expressed is in fact neces-
sarily false, in which case the contradictories of such propositions
are necessarily true. In other words we can prove the truth of Balt-
zly’s principles to ourselves on the basis of the truth of another,
metalinguistic, premiss.16 But this ought not to be possible if they
were really unhypothetical. For such principles, at least when pro-
perly formulated, are supposed to explain themselves better than
anything else could. They let us know that they are true themselves,
without relying on some further principle.
Baltzly has a ready reply to this objection. While one cannot
give a Posterior Analytics-style proof of unhypothetical principles,
Aristotle tells us at 1006A11–13 that one can at least give an elenc-
tic proof of such principles (or at any rate, of his sample principle
PNC), provided someonewho denies it at least says something (&στι
δ ποδε!ξαι 8λεγκτικς κα περ τοτου 3τι δνατον, @ν µνον τι λ+γAη (
µφισβητν). Baltzly could then defend his claim that the principles
he finds in Plato are unhypothetical because they too are proved in
a similar fashion. Those who posit the contradictory of his unhy-
pothetical principles are refuted out of their own mouths just like
Aristotle’s opponent. If what they said were in fact true, then they
would not have been able to say it. And, for both Plato and Aris-
totle, Baltzly holds, this is a kind of proof that what they say must
be false, but not the kind of proof whose premisses would suggest
that the proved theorem is too posterior to be unhypothetical.
Now exactly howAristotle’s elenctic proof is supposed to work is
a matter of considerable debate, into which I do not intend to enter
here. But it is significant, I think, to note a number of disanalogies
between the elenctic proof and theways inwhich Plato arrives at the
propositions Baltzly thinks are unhypothetical, which tend to show
that the latter would not be unhypothetical by Aristotle’s lights, if
16 Baltzly realizes this: see ‘“To an unhypothetical first principle” in Plato’s Re-
public’, 153. It is a merit of his account that he can explain why Plato might have
held this metalinguistic premiss, given his view that ‘philosophical conversation is
an important pathway to truth . . . When the content of a claim is such that, were it
true, it couldn’t be expressed, this is ample reason to think that it must be false.’
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there is supposed to be some non-accidental connection between
being unhypothetical and being susceptible to elenctic proof, what-
ever that is precisely.
Firstly, Aristotle’s elenctic proof seems to rely upon a kind of
circularity (which, of course, Aristotle has freely admitted to at
1005B32–3).Any possible proof of PNC will ultimately rely in some
sense on the truth of that principle because every possible proof so
relies on it. Now it might be that the reason Aristotle says that
PNC admits of an elenctic proof rather than proof proper is that
one can give a partial explanation of PNC with an argument whose
premisses must be in accordance with it. For why else say that
you can prove PNC in any way, given that those who deny its
truth (at least according to Aristotle)17 are hardly going to be the
sort of people who are impressed by proofs of any kind, if not by
way of saying that such a proof will at least explain something
about PNC?18 One might argue that this fact makes any purported
proof of PNC viciously circular. Alternatively one might defend
Aristotle’s proof asMichael Dummett defends a similar version, as
being benignly rather than viciously circular, because PNC is not
asserted in the proof, even if its truth is somehow relied upon.19
But whichever of these opposing views is correct, there is no such
circularity, benign or otherwise, to be found in Plato’s arguments
that the One has some share of being and that some of the kinds
17 I pass over the fact that Aristotle seems to have held that no one actually does
deny PNC—that is, no one actually believes PNC false, even though there may be
some who say it is false: ‘for it is not necessary that the things one says one should
also believe’ (Metaph. 1005B23–4). It may well be that the elenctic proof establishes
that no one really disbelieves PNC, whatever they may say to the contrary: but this
is a consequence of the proof rather than a precondition for it. It is not enough,
in advance of the proof, to assert that such people cannot really believe what they
say: for certainly they will reply that they do believe what they say, and will be
unimpressed by any gainsaying on Aristotle’s part. For even if he is right, and they
do not really believe what they say, if PNC is in fact false, as they think they suppose,
then they will have no reason to suppose they are in the wrong about what they think
they believe.
18 A similar argument might be put against those who hold that Protagoras is
meant to refute himself in Theaet. 177 c–179 b. According to this argument, that
ought not to be what Plato is aiming at, for if refuting yourself is a bad thing because
it involves you in saying something necessarily false, why should such a charge
bother anyone who has denied the possibility of falsehood in the first place? See S.
Waterlow, ‘Protagoras and Inconsistency’, Archiv f•ur Geschichte der Philosophie, 59
(1977), 19–36.
19 For an argument along these lines establishing the ultimacy of PNC, see M.
Wedin, ‘Some Logical Problems inMetaphysics Gamma’,OSAP 19 (2000), 113–62
at 115–19.
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blend. Parmenides’ argument does not depend in any sense on the
thought that the One has some share of being. It depends instead on
the quite di·erent and completely independent thought that what
is being meaningfully talked about must be there to be talked about.
Again, the argument in the Sophist that some of the kinds blend
does not depend in any way on the truth of that thought, but on the
principle that what makes predications true (or even possible) is some
kind of blending. Doubtless these claims are supposed to provide
explanations of why the principles are true. But such explanations
are very di·erent from the (benignly or viciously) circular kind of
which Aristotle’s elenctic proof is an example. Rather, they seem to
be the sort of helpful explanations—prior premisses, if you like—
that you get from ordinary, Posterior Analytics-style proofs.
Secondly, andmore importantly, there seems to be a di·erence in
logical status between the contradictory of Aristotle’s unhypothet-
ical principle PNC and the contradictories of what Baltzly thinks
are Plato’s. The point is best introduced by considering an ex-
ample from the greatmedieval logician John Buridan,whowonders
whether the proposition ‘No proposition is negative’ is self-refuting
or not.20 It looks on the face of it as if it is. For if its truth-conditions
arose, it could not be stated. But, Buridan goes on to argue, even
though ‘No proposition is negative’ is not possibly true, it is at
any rate possible. Provided we construe propositions as tokens of
some sort—that is, as obviously contingent beings—it could well
be that what the proposition says to be the case obtains, that in fact
no propositions are negative, even though the proposition saying
just that obviously would not exist, and hence would not be true,
in such circumstances. This consideration seems to me to open up
another distinction between PNC and Baltzly’s principles. For one
could argue that the contradictories of the latter, but not the contra-
dictory of the former, express possibilities without being possibly
true. After all, is there anything impossible about the One having
no share of being—that is, is there not the possibility of the non-
existence of the One, even if its actuality would render impossible
any thought or expression about it? Or again, what is wrong with
supposing that there might have been nothing at all, which would
surely be the result if none of the kinds blended, even though one
could not, of course, say or think that there was nothing at all in
20 See G. Hughes (ed.), John Buridan on Self-Reference: Chapter Eight of Buri-
dan’s Sophismata (Cambridge, 1982), 37–9.
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such circumstances, since there would not be anything to say or
think it with?
Now it might be that the answer is ‘No’ in both cases, and that
the contradictories of Plato’s principles are supposed to be neither
possibly true nor possible, that the One must have a share of being,
and that at least someof the kindsmust blend.21But if that is so, such
metaphysical commitments are going to require rich arguments
with pretty substantial further premisses. And this is not the case,
at least for Aristotle, when we come to say that the contradictory
of PNC is neither possibly true nor possible. Not only would it
be impossible to express the contradictory of PNC if it were true
(for any purported formulation under such circumstances would,
according to Aristotle, no more express a denial of PNC than an
a¶rmation of it, since everything would be indeterminate). But
also what such a formulation would try but fail to express is not
even a possibility. Even of a world without any propositions to
be thought, written, or said (in so far as Aristotle could entertain
such a possibility) he would surely maintain that it is still never
the case that contradictory properties belong to the same thing
at the same time in the same respect etc. The denial of PNC is
neither possibly true nor possible. But Aristotle will regard this as a
brute fact about the world, admitting of no very deep explanation.
If you want an explanation of how or why a property had by a
certain thing at a certain time in a certain respect excludes the
privation of that property at that time in that respect, then tough
luck. That is just the way things are at the most fundamental level,
and explanations come to an end. By contrast for Plato, if there
is not merely a connection, but a necessary one, between the One
and its being, or the kinds and their blending, that looks without
further ado like the sort of thing that might admit of explanation.
I can only guess at such explanations, as follows, but at least they
spring tomindwithout toomuch sweat. TheOne just is, necessarily,
because it is a Form, and that is the way Forms have their being
(by contrast with sensible things). And at least some of the kinds
blend because some are by themselves incomplete, as are some of
their linguistic correlates, verbs (B$µατα). I am not at all trying to
say that these are the right explanations for Baltzly’s principles,
only that they and their ilk are available. And the important point
21 The former at least seems likely if the One of the deductions in the second part
of the Parmenides is a Form.
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is that they are generalizing explanations. They explain a particular
fact (the One’s having being necessarily; at least some of the kinds
blending) by a more general one (Forms have certain properties,
including being,necessarily; and some kinds,whether they blend or
not, are somehow incomplete). I can think of no such generalizing
explanation for PNC, not even the claim that some things must be
determinate. For just as many things as are determinate abide by
PNC. That things be determinate, and that they abide by PNC, are
for Aristotle two ways of expressing exactly the same condition.22
This di·erence in susceptibility to explanation indicates, to me
at any rate, that PNC and the principles Baltzly finds in Plato
are rather di·erent kinds of claim, admitting of rather di·erent
kinds of proof. From the above facts together with the previous
suggestion that PNC may well be unhypothetical for Plato, we
ought to infer either that those principles are not unhypothetical,
or that unhypothetical principles can be a pretty heterogeneous
bunch.
As things stand at the moment, the former conclusion is prefer-
able. For suppose I am right in arguing that ‘The One has no
share of being’ and ‘None of the kinds blend’ might be proposi-
tions which express possibilities without being possibly true. If all
that is wrong with those propositions (and hence unhypothetical
about their contradictories) is that they could not be expressed if
they were true, then what is there to stop Plato admitting denials of
genuine possibilities as unhypothetical? What is there to stop the
apparently contingent claim ‘Some proposition is negative’ from
being unhypothetical?
It is for this reason, I suppose, that Baltzly’s second paper on this
subject23 turns to another Platonic passage, Theaet. 181 c–183 c
5, arguing that the contradictory of Heraclitus’ claim ‘All things
change in every way’ is unhypothetical on the grounds that if the
Heraclitean claim were true then neither it nor anything else could
be thought, written, or said.24 This case, I think, shows up the
22 For a helpful discussion of this thought, see V. Politis, Aristotle and theMeta-
physics (London, 2004), ch. 5.
23 ‘Aristotle and Platonic Dialectic in Metaphysics Gamma 4’.
24 These sorts of conditions also interest Baltzly in his first paper on the sub-
ject: ‘Plato is interested in philosophical views which are such that if the condi-
tions which would make them true obtained, those same conditions would make
it the case that neither they, nor anything else, could ever be expressed in any
way’ (‘“To an unhypothetical first principle” in Plato’s Republic’, 153, emphasis
Created on 23 November 2005 at 16.44 hours page 117
118 D. T. J. Bailey
heterogeneity of the principles Baltzly discussed in his first paper.
For if the truth-conditions of ‘TheOne has no share of being’ arose,
thenwhile youcouldnot express that proposition, since therewould
be no such thing to say anything about, you could none the less talk,
and maybe even talk truly, about plenty of other things besides
the One. (Similarly: if the truth-conditions for ‘No proposition
is negative’ arose, then, while that proposition itself could not be
expressed, plenty of others still could be, including the logically
equivalent, and true under the circumstances, ‘Every proposition
is positive’). But it seems that the contradictory of ‘All things change
in every way’ has a better claim to be unhypothetical, since if the
truth-conditions of Heraclitus’ claim arose, then, supposedly, no
propositions whatsoever, true or false, could be thought, spoken, or
written. The same is true of the principle from the Sophist, albeit
for a rather di·erent reason. If none of the kinds blended (and
in particular nothing blended with being, including itself),25 then
one could not express that fact or any other—but not this time
because the world would be too dizzyingly fluxy for one to think,
write, or speak, but because there would be literally nothing at all.
Heraclitus’ problem is that he describes a possible world one could
not talk or think about were it actual: an intolerably unstable and
incoherent world, but a possible world none the less, in fact one
in which one might get to grips with things semantically in the
minimalist way in which poorCratylus is said to have ended up, i.e.
by pointing. Indeed, some think that there is a good sense in which
Heraclitus’ world is actual, for it is nothing other than the sensible
world as characterized in Plato’s middle dialogues. By contrast, the
late-learners’ problem is that they imagine a world that would in
fact be non-existent, or empty. These are clearly two very di·erent
ways of logoi failing to have any applications. So it ought to be the
case that the corresponding principles derived from consideration
added). But if only those conditions determine unhypothetical principles, the claim
that the One has a share of being will not be unhypothetical, as I argue in the main
text.
25 The late-learners do not recognize blending; and yet they permit themselves
identity statements. So arguably the fact of Being’s being the same as itself does not
involve any kind of blending. But, equally arguably, Being would be the same as itself
even if it had no being (for arguments in this style see C.McGinn, Logical Properties
(Oxford, 2000), ch. 2). Moreover, the wording of the non-blending hypothesis is as
strong as my reading tries to express: it is the set-up in which nothing has the power
to associate with anything, not merely anything else.
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of such situations are rather di·erent. But this might count against
treating them both as unhypothetical.
5. Destroying hypotheses?
Let us leave these objections for the moment: for it is not my task,
at least in this paper, to say what other principles are unhypotheti-
cal for Plato, but to cast doubt on the thought that these ones are.
But there is one final piece of evidence that the principles Baltzly
finds in the dialogues are unhypothetical, a clue which takes us
back toMetaphysics Γ. Supposedly, what they all have in common
is that their contradictories are, arguably, self-refutingly false. Plato
thereby establishes their putatively unhypothetical truth by destroy-
ing their contradictories (or, better, showing how their contradic-
tories destroy themselves). But there is some important connection
for both Plato and Aristotle between unhypothetical principles and
one of the Greek words for destroying, ναιρε!ν. Towards the end
ofRepublic 7 Plato tells us that the mathematicians are only dream-
ing of being, on account of their not explaining their hypotheses,
while the superior method of dialectic does something or other to
hypotheses (to be discussed below) in order to secure them (τς
/ποθ+σεις ναιρο)σα, 8π α.τν τν ρχν, Cνα βεβαιDσηται, 533 c 8–9
in the text of J. Burnet, 533 c 9–d 1 in that of S. Slings (the punctu-
ation here is that of Slings)). Meanwhile, inMetaphysicsΓAristotle
tells us that the person responsible for the force of the elenctic proof
of PNC is not its proponent but its opponent, some character like
Heraclitus: and the reason for this is that such a person submits
to argument in the act of destroying it (ναιρν γρ λγον /ποµ+νει
λγον, 1006A26).
Initially we might expect these two forms of ναιρε!ν to mean the
same, given the identical philosophical contexts—the nature of un-
hypothetical principles—and the proximity of the magic word for
‘unhypothetical’, νυπθετον. These conditions suggest that Aris-
totle and Plato must have been thinking along such similar lines
that uses of forms of the same verb in di·erent senses for each
author would seem to be either surprising coincidence or error on
the part of the later author. However, I am going to argue that we
ought to take it as coincidence or error.
Firstly, let us run through the one argument of which I am aware
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for saying that the expressionsmean the same. It is quite clear that in
Aristotle’s text, ναιρε!ν must mean ‘destroying’ or ‘eliminating’.26
The point is that the opponentwho objects to PNC refutes himself,
by ‘abiding by speech’ (i.e. speaking at all) in the act of trying to
destroy it by asserting the contrary of its intelligibility, PNC. The
sense of ναιρε!ν as ‘to take up’ is not available here. For even if we
could get any sense out of such a translation, it would not convey
the important point that it is the objector to PNC himself, rather
than his opponent Aristotle, who is poignantly responsible for his
own refutation, by virtue of making use of what he tries to destroy
in the act of trying to destroy it. This is how Sextus Empiricus, for
example, used exactly the same word to point out that his argument
in favour of global scepticism about non-relative matters of fact
destroys itself, much as a fire consumes itself once it has consumed
everything else available (M. 8. 480–1). So anyone wanting to argue
that Aristotle is following Plato in his use of this word ought to
impute the same sense to Plato’s use of ναιρε!ν in the passage from
the Republic. In other words, they have to tell us what it means for
a dialectician to destroy hypotheses. According to Baltzly, dialectic
‘destroys hypotheses’ by operating on contradictory hypotheses,
one of which is self-refuting, the other of which is unhypothetical.
Dialectic destroys the former by exposing its self-refuting nature,
and destroys the latter by eradicating its hypothetical character.27
My disagreement with this is as follows. I find it hard to accept
that, in Republic 7, ναιρε!ν is not a univocal verb, an expression for
one and the same dialectical process, which on Baltzly’s story it is
not. There is the destruction of showing that a proposition is self-
refutingly false, and the destruction of showing that a proposition
is secure well beyond the provisional status it was taken to have at
the start of an enquiry.These are very di·erent kinds of destruction
indeed, somuch so that it seems too perverse to have the same name
for them. But anyhow, even if ναιρε!νneed not be univocal, it just is
not the case that the contradictories of the mathematicians’ hypothe-
ses are ever in consideration, either in the Republic or anywhere else
in Plato. And it is on the topic of the mathematicians’ hypotheses in
Republic 7 that dialectic emerges as the more esteemed science. It is
26 The latter is favoured by C. Kirwan (trans.), Aristotle’sMetaphysics Books Γ,
∆, Ε (Oxford, 1971), 9.
27 Baltzly, ‘“To an unhypothetical first principle” in Plato’s Republic’, 153; ‘Aris-
totle and Platonic Dialectic inMetaphysics Gamma 4’, 195.
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what the mathematicians say for the sake of reaching their conclu-
sions that is the object of the participle ναιρο)σα.But there is no call
for such propositions as ‘There are no such things as triangles’ or
‘There are no odd or even numbers’ (or even ‘A straight line is not a
line which lies evenly with the points on itself’)28 to be destroyed by
being exposed as self-refuting (even if such an unlikely thing could
be done). For unlike the theses of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the
late-learners, no one (so far as I know) even professes to entertain
such odd claims. Dialectic does not secure the propositions that
are merely hypothetical in the mathematicians’ mouths by treating
their contradictories as hypotheses and then destroying them. Such
a game would hardly be worth the candle, because their contradic-
tories are at best based onmisunderstandings, at worst plainly false
(and not e.g. false because of some metalinguistic claim that what
can be true can be stated when it is true). If we think of characters
who did actually contradict some of what the mathematicians said
(although we hear nothing of them in the dialogues)—I am think-
ing here of the Protagoras ofMetaph. 998A37–9, who ‘refutes’ the
geometers by saying that the circle touches a ruler not at a point29—
then the right tactic for making mathematics secure is surely not to
argue that such people have refuted themselves, trying to say some-
thing that could not in fact be said if it were true, but only that they
have misunderstood the mathematicians (which is something both
Plato and Aristotle would say of Protagoras: the former, that he
does not realize that the mathematicians hypothesize for the sake
of the super-sensible world, the latter, that he is ignorant of the
qua-operator).30
Instead, I take it that when Plato speaks of the superiority of
dialectic to mathematics, he has the same sort of problem with the
28 This would be the contradictory of Euclid’s fourth definition, ‘A straight line
is a line which lies evenly with the points on itself’.
29 I avoid the question of whether or not the claim that the line touches a circle at
a point would count as a hypothesis for Plato’s mathematicians, or as a consequence
of prior hypotheses.
30 In Baltzly’s defence, one might argue that Parmenides’ claim that there is just
one thing is inconsistent with the mathematicians’ hypothesis that there are numbers
i.e. pluralities of units; and further that one might destroy Parmenides’ monist
hypothesis by showing it to be self-refuting by e.g. arguing that if his hypothesis
were true, then (a) it would have to exist in order to be true and (b) what it speaks
of, the One, would have to exist to make it true, in which case (c) there are at least
two things. But such a route would take us far from the texts and require deeply
prejudicial interpretations both of Parmenides and of Plato’s understanding of him.
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mathematicians’ starting-points as Frege had with the definitions
of later mathematicians. In the introduction to theGrundlagen, we
read the following complaint, in which one might get the sense
of Plato’s problem if one understood ‘hypothesis’ for ‘definition’
throughout:
Most mathematicians rest content, in enquiries of this kind [sc. enquiries
into the definitions of mathematical concepts], when they have satisfied
their immediate needs. If a definition shows itself tractable when used in
proofs, if no contradictions are anywhere encountered, and if connexions
are revealed between matters apparently remote from one another, this
leading to an advance in order and regularity, it is usual to regard the
definition as su¶ciently established, and few questions are asked as to its
logical justification. This procedure has at least the advantage that it makes
it di¶cult to miss the mark altogether. Even I agree that definitions must
show their worth by their fruitfulness: it must be possible to use them
for constructing proofs. Yet it must still be borne in mind that the rigour
of the proof remains an illusion, even though no link be missing in the
chain of our deductions, so long as the definitions are justified only as an
afterthought, by our failing to come across any contradiction. By these
methods we shall, at bottom, never have achieved more than an empirical
certainty, and wemust really face the possibility that we may still in the end
encounter a contradiction which brings the whole edifice down in ruins.31
Barring only the talk of ‘an empirical certainty’, Frege’s complaint
here seems to me to be very Platonic. For in so far as Plato’s ma-
thematicians have not justified their hypotheses and thereby do not
know them, to that extent their conclusions might, albeit contrary
to all expectation, turn out to be mistaken. Moreover, Frege seems
to hold that the best that can be expected of proofs conducted from
unexamined principles is that ‘no link be missing in the chain of
deductions’, which would correspond well with one way of taking
Rep. 510 d 2, where the mathematicians are described as proceed-
ing to a conclusion coherently (διεξιντες τελευτσιν (µολογουµ+νως).
The last word here can be taken as meaning that the mathemati-
cians pursue their conclusion by means of coherent inferences, and
that this much alone can be said in their favour.32 But as we know
from a famous passage in the Cratylus (436 b 12–c 7), where the il-
lustration is a mathematical one, this is no guarantee that any such
31 Gottlob Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, trans. J. L. Austin (Oxford,
1950), p. ix.
32 This line appears to be taken by, among others, M. M. McCabe, Plato’s Indi-
viduals (Princeton, 1994), 73.
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inferences are true. Such a guarantee could come only from this
together with knowledge of the starting-points, which is precisely
what Plato’s mathematicians do not bother to acquire. For Plato,
it seems that mathematics as practised in his day might track the
truth no less than dialectic, but its practitioners do not know this
because they do not strive for the intelligibility characteristic of the
better science. They do not know, nor seek to know, why what they
think they know is true, if in the end it is.33
But—and here we return to what might be meant by ‘destroying
hypotheses’—anyone who makes such points as I hold Plato and
Frege both make on this score is concerned to bolster the starting-
points of mathematics in someway other than by arguing that their
contradictories are false, or even necessarily false. For Plato, no less
than for Frege, the contradictories of mathematical starting-points
just are not germane to the discussion at all. And any operation
performed on those starting-points so as to remedy a deficiency in
our understanding of them will only very queerly be said to involve
some sort of ‘destruction’. Consider a similar case. If you produce
a valid argument by which you can infer q from p, then there is
a sense in which you have destroyed q’s inconsequentiality with
respect to p. Well, you can talk like that if you like; and it might
even be that if you were prone to Plato’s mystical moods in such
intellectually refined contexts, you would actually want to talk like
that. But if you cared for being understood as readily as possible,
it is an oddly indirect and perverse way to put things. And for all
his appealing mysticism we should not attribute such perversity to
Plato unless we can help it.
Fortunately, Plato’s texts generally carry some weight against
translating ναιρο)σα as ‘destroying’ anyhow. For while Aristotle
usually uses ναιρο)σα in its ‘destructive’ sense, which was certainly
the dominant usage in his day, Plato hardly ever does, if at all.
Forms of the verb occur most frequently in the Laws, active ones
at 642 e 1, 870 d 3, and 914 a 3, middle ones at 914 b 6, 921 a 8,
33 Hence Plato’s repeated talk of the connection betweenmathematics and dream-
ing. At Rep. 533 b 9–c 1 the mathematicians dream of that which is (τ' ,ν). The
slave boy in theMeno has acquired beliefs about the geometrical theorem Socrates
demonstrates ‘as if in a dream’ (Meno 85 c 9–10). I understand the haziness of their
dreaming to indicate a lack of understanding rather than certainty. When the slave is
advised, at 98 a, to tie down his beliefs with the α?τ5ας λογισµ1, the analogy with se-
curing the statues of Daedalus (presumably by attaching them to something heavier
than themselves) suggests the epistemological securing involved in relating beliefs
to other more certain beliefs, which begets understanding of those posterior beliefs.
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and 921 b 3. None of these forms, with a trivial exception I shall
come to later, can mean ‘destroy’. The active forms (at least the
first and third) have the same sense as the occurrence at Ap. 21 a
6, referring to a god’s action in ordaining or pronouncing on some
matter (νε!λεν, ‘replied’, is the verb predicated of the Pythia when
she tells Chaerephon that no one is wiser than Socrates). Of the
middle forms, the first straightforwardlymeans ‘take up for oneself’
(the passage is discussing what to do with the man who holds to the
principle that finders are keepers), while the other two again mean
‘take up’, referring to a contractor who has taken up a piece of work
and charges a fee for it. Likewise, the occurrences of the verb in the
Phaedrus at 233 c 2–3 and 243 c 5, both in the middle, have nothing
to do with destruction but again connote a kind of taking up.Here it
is the taking up of violent hostility (&χθρα)—English has the clich‹ed
expression ‘to take up the cudgels’—which the non-lover will not
be brought to by teething-troubles in relationships according to
the first passage, and which the second passage says is typical of
the behaviour of lovers, at least according to the sort of speeches
Socrates deplores in the recantation of his first speech. Obviously
the point is not that such lovers destroy enmity. Rather, they take
it up for themselves in their aggrieved passion. Furthermore, the
uses of the verb in later sections of the Republic both involve taking
up: the passive form at 614 b 4–5 refers to the taking up of dead
bodies after a battle (cf. Menex. 243 c 6), and the middle form at
617 e 7 means ‘take up for oneself’ as at Laws 914 b 6. In fact,
the only place I have been able to find in Plato where one might
plausibly translate a form of ναιρε!ν as ‘to destroy’, besides our
disputed Republic passage, is at Laws 870 d 3, where we are told
that fears bred of cowardice and iniquity can bring men to murder:
for instance, when such men ναιρο)σι θαντοις those who might
divulge their secrets. Here you could translate ναιρο)σι as ‘they
destroy’ if you like. For such men, in removing their potential
betrayers ‘with death’, obviously destroy them. But the presence
of θαντοις allows you even here to avoid that option and translate
the whole expression as ‘they take them away [i.e. despatch them]
with death’.
Now even though Plato does not seem to use an available sense
of a word in any other context, he might still be using it with that
sense in ourRepublic 7 passage. But the plurality of kinds of ‘taking
up’ that the verb means in active, middle, and passive forms—from
Created on 23 November 2005 at 16.44 hours page 124
Plato and Aristotle on the Unhypothetical 125
the taking up of the wallet on the wayside, and the taking up of the
cudgels in a lovers’ ti·, to the taking up of an odd job formoney—all
this suggests that if we can tell any story at all about how dialectic
might ‘take up’ hypotheses for its own ends, thenwewill be justified
in translating ναιρο)σα as I am urging. Fortunately there is such
a story. The idea would be that, just as you would take an object
into direct sunlight if you wanted to have the best possible look at
it, so likewise dialectic takes up and presents the mathematicians’
hypotheses to the unhypothetical principle (8π α.τν τν ρχ$ν)
with a view to explaining them in the light of that principle. This
kind of ‘taking up’ will presumably involve arguing that any such
hypothesis will bear the συµφωνε!ν relation from the Phaedo to the
principle (which amounts to giving a justification or explanation
for the hypothesis), so once it has been taken up into the hands of
dialectic it lacks the unexplained, provisional status it had in the
mathematicians’ mouths. This is what it means to ναιρε!νhypothe-
ses, and it is surprising no one has suggested it before, especially
given the claim in 533 d 2 (d 2–3 in the new OCT) that dialectic
draws upwards (νγει 4νω) the eye of the soul.34 Nothing destruc-
tive is going on, and rightly so—dialectic is a method of reinforcing
the starting-points of mathematics with a deeper understanding of
them, rather than trying to expose the shaky foundations of the
essential element in the Guardians’ education. Such reinforcement
involves grasping hypotheses and appropriately connecting them
with the unhypothetical.35 So it seems as if it is either from coinci-
dence ormisunderstanding that Aristotle should use the sameword
with a quite di·erent sense when speaking about the same topic.36
I have argued that both philosophers share the same concep-
tion of the unhypothetical; that what is avowedly unhypothetical
34 I am grateful to Bob Sharples for drawing my attention to this.
35 My interpretation requires a repunctuation of the text, deleting the comma
after ναιρο)σα, which is present in both editions of the OCT. (Slings’s addition of
a comma after ρχ$ν is quite compatible with my reading.)
36 This disjunction is not meant to be exhaustive. There is at least one other
possibility, suggested to me by Verity Harte, which I lack the imagination and space
to discuss in any detail. It could be that Aristotle knew perfectly well what Plato was
trying to say using ναιρο)σα in this context, but is for some reason twitting him by
using the same word in a di·erent sense. In that case the intertextual relation would
not be one of coincidence or misunderstanding, but one of polemic. It might be
relevant to this interpretation that Aristotle here uses the verb /ποµ+νειν for a logical
or dialectical relation, which Plato only ever does once, atH.Ma. 298 d 4 (and even
that is debatable).
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for Aristotle might also have been so for Plato; and that the in-
tertextual relations on this topic are strong enough to cast doubt
on some shrewd attempts to identify unhypothetical principles in
Plato. But when it comes to the verb ναιρε!ν, I think those relations
are constituted by either accident or mistake.
Corpus Christi College, Oxford
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